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DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION - Clarification of Illegitimate's
Right to Irherit from Intestate Father - Larsen v. Kimble,
447 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1984), reh'g denied (1984).
FACTS OF THE CASE
In October 1981, Darlene Larsen filed petitions in the Chan-
cery Court of Copiah County, seeking to share in the estate of
Earl B. Kimble as his alleged granddaughter.1 Larsen claimed that
her mother, Earl Irene Stuart Kimble, was the .illegitimate daughter
of Earl B. Kimble and Edith Stuart, who had never married each
other. Earl B. Kimble died on May 21, 1981; after his estate was
probated,2 it was distributed entirely to his widow, Mable Kimble.
Since Earl Irene Stuart Kimble had died on September 9, 1976,
Mable Kimble and Kimble's alleged granddaughter, Darlene
Larsen, were his sole survivors.'
Larsen first sought to prove the paternity of her mother and
then to assert a claim to Kimble's estate through her mother. Pri-
or to an evidentiary hearing, the chancery court consolidated and
dismissed Larsen's petitions with prejudice."
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in a six-to-two decision,
reversed the lower court and remanded for a full hearing on the
merits of Larsen's claim to Kimble's estate.' The court held that
Larsen could properly sue to determine her heirship descending
from the father of her illegitimate mother,6 and that her claim,
brought within the statutory period, was timely filed.7
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
At common law the illegitimate child -one born before mar-
riage or so long after the dissolution of marriage that the hus-
band could not have been the father'-was deemed to be nullius
filius, the child of no one.9 As such, the illegitimate child could
not inherit." Indeed, as far as the common law was concerned,
1. Larsen v. Kinable, 447 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1984), reh'g. denied (1984). Larsen's first petition sought
to determine the heirs of Earl B. Kimble; the second was a petition to reopen his estate. Id.




5. Id. at 1283.
6. Id. at 1282; Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(3) (Supp. 1985).
7. 447 So. 2d at 1283; Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(3)(D)(ii) (Supp. 1985).
8. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARWIS *459. The early English law did not, however, classify as illegiti-
mate a child conceived before, but born after, the marriage of his or her natural parents. This exception was
allowed as an "incide:it that can happen but once, since all future children will be begotten, as well as born,
within the rules of honor asd civil society." Id. at *456.
9. H. KRAUSE, ILLEWorMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POuCY 3 (1971).
10. 1 W. BLACKS-rONE, supra note 8, at *459.
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this difference in inheritance rights was the chief distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate children."
The harshness of this common law approach has been mitigated
by statutes in all jurisdictions which put illegitimate children on
substantially equal terms with their legitimate siblings concern-
ing inheritance from the mother." Since 1848, Mississippi has
allowed illegitimate children full inheritance rights from the mother
and her kindred,' and by 1906, children of illegitimates could,
to a limited extent, inherit from their grandparents and the
brothers and sisters of their mother or father."
Until very recently, however, illegitimate children rarely were
entitled to inherit from the father. This distinction between mater-
nal and paternal inheritance rights stemmed partly from the
difficulties of proving paternity6 The majority of state intestacy
statutes, therefore, focused on those things which the parents could
do to render the child legitimate for the purpose of paternal in-
heritance.' 7 Under the Mississippi law in effect until 1981, it was
necessary for the father to have acknowledged the child as his
11. H. KRAUSE, supra note 9, at 5. Blackstone detailed the discrimination suffered by the illegitimate: "The
incapacity of a bastard consists principally in this, that he cannot be heir to any one, neither can he have heirs,
but of his own body; for, being nulliusfilius, he is therefore of kin to nobody, and has no ancestor from whom
any inheritable blood can be derived." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *459,
12. T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 82 (2d ed. 1953). This allowance was made because
of the state's recognition that maternity is normally beyond doubt. H. KRAUSE, supra note 9, at 25.
13. HurcsION'S CODE OF 5848, ch. 35, art. 2(4), which provided that "[hiereafter all illegitimate children
shall inherit the property of their mothers, and from each other as the children of the half-blood, according
to the statutes of descent and distribution now in force in this state."
Although at first this statute was strictly construed so as to bar reciprocal inheritance by the mother from
her illegitimate child, see, e.g., Alabama and Vicksburg Railway Co. v. Williams, 78 Miss. 209, 28 So. 853
(1900), provision has since been made for this. See, e.g., HEMINGWAY'S CODE OF 1917 § 1454 (Supp. 1924),
which provided that "[tihe mother of an illegitimate, her other children, and her kindred, whether they be legiti-
mate or illegitimate, shall inherit from an illegitimate according to the statutes of descent and distribution."
As an example of illegitimate children inheriting from the mother's kindred, see McDaniel v. McDaniel,
123 Miss. 401, 85 So. 113 (1920), where illegitimate children were allowed to inherit their deceased mother's
share of her intestate brother's estate.
14. "But the children of illegitimates shall not inherit from any ancestor or collateral kindred if there be
legitimate heirs of such ancestor or collateral kindred, in the same degree, to whom the estate would otherwise
descend." Miss. CODE OF i906, ch. 35, § 1655.
15. Id.
16. T. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 85. See generally, Comment, The Inheritance Rights of Illegimnate
Children in Georgia: The Role of a Judicial Determination of Paternity, 16 GA. L. RaV. 170 (1981).
However, as Krause pointed out in 1971, any possible uncertainty that may exist in paternity cases on the
average does not support the states' completely barring illegitimates from offering proof as to paternity. H.
KRAUSE, supra note 9, at 82. Nevertheless, such remained the prevalent statutory treatment in most states up
until the Supreme Court's opinion in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1976). See infra notes 25-38 and ac-
companying text.
17. H. KRAUSE, supra note 9, at 44-45.
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and to have lawfully married the mother in order for his illegiti-
mate child fto inherit. 8
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court adhered strictly to these
stringent requirements for paternal inheritance rights up through
the 1970's, 9 similar statutes denying to illegitimates the same rights
granted to legitimate children came under the scrutiny of the United
States Supreme Court. The first case in which the Supreme Court
considered tfe constitutionality under the equal protection clause 0
of such restrictive intestate succession laws was Labine v.
Vincent.2
In Labine, the Court rejected a challenge to a Louisiana statute
which allowed illegitimates to inherit from their father only when
the estate would otherwise escheat to the state." Despite this harsh
distinction between the rights of legitimate and illegitimate chil-
dren, the Court declined to find a violation of the equal protec-
tion clause. The Court based its holding on the absence of any
statutorily-iraposed "insurmountable barrier" to inheritance, since
the father could have provided for the child by executing a will,
marrying the mother or formally legitimating the child.2
The "minimal scrutiny"2 applied by the Court to the statute
challenged ina Labine was abandoned in the 1977 case of Trimble
v. Gordon.2" In Trimble, the Court examined an Illinois intestacy
18. MISs. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15 (1972) (amended 1981 & 1983). Specifically, for the child to "be legiti-
mate and capable in law to inherit and transmit inheritance as if bom in wedlock," three things must have been
shown: 1) that the child was the man's natural daughter; 2) that the man later married the mother; and 3) that
the man acknowledg 3d the child as his. Thomas v. Thomas, 200 Miss. 96, 101-02, 25 So. 2d 710, 710 (1946).
Although the cour: held that the requisite acknowledgment had to be shown by clear, convincing and unam-
biguous evidence, atts of recognition or spoken acknowledgment could meet this standard, and actual support
by the father of the :hild was not required to be shown. Hulitt v. Jones, 220 Miss. 827, 832, 72 So. 2d 204,
'206 (1954).
19. See, e.g., Ahers v. Estate of Johnson, 236 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1970), in which the court affirmed a
chancery court's deci iion which disallowed the claim of illegitimate children against their alleged paternal grand-
father, holding that Miss. CODE ANN. § 474 (Supp. 1956) restricted illegitimates to inheritance from the mater-
nal side. "No provision is made for inheritance from the father, the reasons for which we believe to be obvious."
Id. at 440.
And, even though the court applied the Supreme Court's decision in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973)
to strike out a provition of Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-29(2) (1972) which discriminated against illegitimates
in the scope of paternal support, it carefully noted that the "decision in the present case does not weaken the
authority of this Stat , to provide for exclusion of illegitimates from inheriting property from intestate natural
fathers." Rias v. Henderson, 342 So. 2d 737, 741 (Miss. 1977).
20. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. 401 U.S. 53 (1971).
22. "Natural children are called to the inheritance of their natural father, who has duly acknowledged them,
when he has left no descendants nor ascendants, nor collateral relations, nor surviving wife, and to the exclu-
sion only of the State." LA. Ctv. CODE ANN. art. 919 (West 1952) (held unconstitutional in Succession of
Brown, 379 So. 2d 1172 (La. Ct. App.), affd, 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980) (amended 1981)).
23. 401 U.S. at 539.
24. In Labine, thi: Court deferred to the state interest in promoting the "legal family" relationship. Seeburg-
er, The Muddle of th Middle Tier: The Coming Crisis in Equal Protection, 48 Mo. L. REv. 587, 599 (1983).
25. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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succession statute" "more critically." 7 The Court rejected the "in-
surmountable barrier" approach of Labine"8 because its focus on
hypothetical courses of action the intestate father "might have taken
to assure some inheritance for his illegitimate children"' 9 lost sight
of the essential question presented: "the constitutionality of dis-
crimination against illegitimates in a state succession law." " Fur-
thermore, this decision of constitutionality depended "upon the
character of the discrimination and its relation to legitimate legis-
lative aims." "
In Trimble, the Court recognized that the state had substantial
interests in establishing accurate methods of property disposition
and in avoiding the spurious claims which might accompany the
difficulty of proof in paternity cases." However, the Court found
that the Illinois statute was unconstitutional for failing to provide
any "middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion
and case-by-case determination of paternity." 3 While recogniz-
ing that difficulties in proving paternity might justify a more
demanding standard for illegitimates claiming from their fathers
than either that required for illegitimates claiming from their
mothers, or that for legitimate children generally, " the Court held
that such a standard could not exclude even those forms of proof
which do not compromise the state's interests." Thus, the Illinois
26. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 2-2 (Smith-Hurd 1978), which provided in part that
[a]n illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor and of any person from whom
his mother might have inherited, if living; and the lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall represent
such person and take by descent any estate which the parent would have taken, if living. A child who
was illegitimate whose parents intermarry and who is acknowledged by the father as the father's child
is legitimate.
27. "[I]t is apparent that we have examined the Illinois statute more critically than the Court examined the
Louisiana statute in Labine. To the extent that our analysis in this case differs from that in Labine, the more
recent analysis controls." 430 U.S. at 176 n.11.
28. The Court recognized its departure in reasoning from Labine without overruling it. "Labine v. Vincent,
supra, is difficult to place in the pattern of this Court's equal protection decisions, and subsequent cases have
limited its force as a precedent." Id. at 767 n. 12. The Court added that, though some amount ofjudicial discre-
tion is required when the challenged statute deals with substantial state interests, "there is a point beyond which
such deference cannot justify discrimination." Id.
29. Id. at 774.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 769 (quoting Matthew v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 (1976)).
32. Id. at 770. The Court did, however, expressly refuse to recognize a state interest in influencing the
"actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relationships."
Id. at 769. Because illegitimate children can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status, laws
penalizing the child are unjust and ineffective ways of deterring the parents from illicit relationships. Id. at 770.
However, the Court has held that the parents who are themselves responsible for their unmarried status may
be subject to legal disabilities distinct from those of married parents. Seeburger, supra note 24, at 602. See,
e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (upholding a Georgia statute which prohibited a father who
had not legitimated his son from suing for the child's wrongful death); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979)
(upholding the denial of "mother's benefits" under the Social Security Act to mothers who never married nor
were dependent on the wage-earner (the illegitimate child's father)).
33. 430 U.S at 770-71.
34. Id. at 770.
35. Id. at 772 n. 14. The Court stated that evidence of a prior adjudication or formal acknowledgment of
paternity "clearly" does not compromise the state's interest in efficient and accurate property disposition. Id.
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statute, which required both the parents' marriage and acknowledg-
ment by the father, extended "well beyond the asserted purposes"'
of the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children, and
so violated equal protection."'
The Couri: further refined its "traditional" equal protection anal-
ysis" in Lali v. Lalli,"9 in which an illegitimate child challenged
a New York statute requiring an adjudication of paternity during
the father's lifetime for paternal inheritance. ' Faced with the same
issue as in 7rimble, that of whether the remaining statutory ob-
stacles to inheritance by illegitimate children could be squared
with the equal protection clause,"1 the Court answered affirma-
tively, finding the New York statutory requirement "substantial-
ly related" to the important state interest in efficient distribution
of property after death. ' An adjudication of paternity during the
father's lifetime, because it was "designed to ensure the accurate
resolution of claims of paternity" while minimizing "the potential
for disruption of estate administration," ' was a valid state proce-
dure in the intestacy scheme. Distinguishing the statute in Trim-
ble, which imposed two requirements as absolute preconditions
to inheritance," from the single "evidentiary" requirement ' of the
New York statute, the Court found that the New York law did
not reach "far in excess of its justifiable goals" so as to disqualify
an "unnecessarily large number of children born out of wedlock,"'
as did the flawed Illinois statute in Trimble.,7
Until 1981, Mississippi's statute on intestate succession remained
similar to the one declared unconstitutional in Trimble, in that
inheritance was allowed only if the father acknowledged the child
36. Id. at 773.
37. Id. at 776.
38. Under this analysis, the Court "asks whether this statutory differentiation on the basis of illegitimacy
is justified by the promotion of recognized state objectives." Trimble, 430 U.S. at 773-74.
39. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
40. N.Y. EST. 'owvE a & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1981), which provided in part that
[a] child born out of wedlock is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his issue inherit from
his father and fis paternal kindred if. . . a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime
of the father, fiade an order of filiation declaring paternity ....
The Court limited its approval of the statute only by the requirement that the judicial adjudication of paternity
be issued during th,; lifetime of the father, since the New York court had not ruled on the constitutionality
of the two-year limitation within which the claim was to be filed. 439 U.S. at 267 n. 5.
41. 439 U.S. at 266.
42. Id. at 275-75.
43. Id. at 271. Accuracy was "enhanced by placing the paternity disputes in a judicial forum during the
lifetime of the fathei ," when he would be available to contribute to the fact-finding process and defend himself
from "unjust accusations." Id.
44. Id. at 266. The combination of requiring the father's acknowledgment of paternity and the intermarri-
age of the parents had been found to eliminate the "middle ground" deemed necessary by the Court. Id.
45. Id. at 267.
46. Id. at 273.
47. Id.
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and married the mother. ' Although the Mississippi Supreme Court
never declared the statute unconstitutional,"' the legislature
amended it in 19810 to greatly increase the inheritance rights of
illegitimate children1 The amended version listed a number of
events which would enable the child to inherit from the father:
marriage by the natural parents before the birth of the child; an
adjudication of paternity or legitimacy during the father's lifetime;
or an adjudication of paternity after the father's death, based upon
clear and convincing evidence, and brought within one year after
the father's death or ninety days after the first published notice
to creditors, whichever is less. 2 In addition, a specific provision
addressed claims which exist prior to the amendment's enactment.
Such claims concerning the estate of an intestate who died before
July 1, 1981, could be brought within three years from July 1,
1981.53
In 1983, the legislature again amended § 91-1-15 of the Mis-
sissippi Code to include the definitions of "remedy," "claim,"
"illegitimate," and "natural parents" as used in the statute.' This
amendment was necessary, the legislature stated, to clarify the
legislative intent in creating "a new, separate and distinct remedy
for the claims of all illegitimates without classification," such reme-
dy to be bestowed retrospectively and prospectively, within the
established limitations.
The legislature apparently passed the 1983 amendment to §
91-1-15 in response to judicial conflict regarding the proper sta-
48. Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15 (1972) (amended 1981 & 1983) provided that "[i]f any man beget a child
or children by a woman whom he shall afterward marry, such child or children, if acknowledged by the man,
shall, in virtue of such marriage and acknowledgment, be legitimate and capable in law to inherit and transmit
inheritance as if born in wedlock." See also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
49. The court declined in several cases to consider the statute's constitutionality. In Knight v. Moore, 396
So. 2d 31 (Miss. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 817 (1981), decided three months before the amended version
of § 91-1-15 went into effect, the court dismissed an illegitimate daughter's heirship proceedings as barred
by the six-year statute of limitations contained in Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-49 (1972). The court therefore
did not address the daughter's argument that § 91-1-15 was unconstitutional in light of Trimble. Id. at 33.
In Estate of Miller v. Miller, 409 So. 2d 715 (Miss. 1982) the court reversed and remanded an heirship
suit filed in 1980 in which the chancellor had declared the unamended version of § 91-1-15 unconstitutional;
the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the issue of constitutionality had not been properly brought before
the court. Id. at 718.
50. Act of April 23, 1981, ch. 529, § 1, 1981 Miss. Laws 1615.
51. See generally, 1981 Miss. S. Ct. Rev: Misc., 52 Miss. L.J. 481 (June 1982).
52. Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(3) (1972) (amended 1981 & 1983). The amended version also placed cer-
tain qualifications on the effect of judicial determinations of paternity made outside Mississippi.
53. MIss. CoDE ANN. § 91-1-15(d)(ii) (Supp. 1985) (amended 1981 & 1983) provided that
La) remedy is hereby created in favor of all illegitimates having any claim existing prior to July 1,
1981, concerning the estate of an intestate whose death occurred prior to such date by or on behalf
of an illegitimate or an alleged illegitimate child to inherit from or through its natural father and any
claim by a natural father to inherit from or through an illegitimate child shall be brought within three
(3) years from and after July 1, 1981, and such period shall run notwithstanding the minority of a child.
54. Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(l)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1985).
55. Act of March 14, 1983, ch. 339, 1983 Miss. Laws 92.
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tute of limitations to apply to the new remedy. The problem
stemmed from the decision of Knight v. Moore,' which was decid-
ed three months before the amended version of § 91-1-15 went
into effect. Hn Knight, the court dismissed an illegitimate daugh-
ter's heirship proceedings as barred by the six-year statute of limi-
tations contained in § 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code."
In the 1983 case of Estate of Kidd v. Kidd, 8 the court inter-
preted the amended version of § 91-1-15 to create a new cause
of action, which accrued on the date the act went into effect (July
1, 1981)." However, the language in Kidd implied that the stat-
ute of limitations would be for a period of six years, to run from
July 1, 1981.60
Confusion also was engendered by the court's holding in Witt
v. Mitchell."' In Witt, the court refused tO apply the Trimble deci-
sion retroactrively,'" and implied that the three-year savings clause
of amended § 91-1-15 applied only to cases accruing after or pend-
ing on April 26, 1977, the date of the Trimble decision.63
INSTANT CASE
The majoiity in Larsen v. Kimble reversed the lower court based
on a pair of legal holdings. First, the court held that Darlene Larsen
had a cause of action under the amended version of § 91-1-15"'
to assert a claim against her alleged grandfather's estate.6 Sec-
ond, her cldm was timely filed, since the three-year statute of
limitations applied to the facts of her case."
In deciding that Larsen was entitled to assert the claim, the
majority first found that Larsen's mother, Earl Irene Stuart Kim-
ble, had had no right to assert a claim against Earl Kimble. Be-
cause he was alive during the whole of Earl Irene Stuart Kimble's
lifetime,"' she never had an action to be declared his heir, since
56. 396 So. 2d :1 (Miss. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 817 (1981).
57. Id. at 33.
58. 435 So. 2d 632 (Miss. 1983).
59. Id. at 635.
60. Id.
61. 437 So. 2d 63 (Miss. 1983).
62. Id.
63. Comment, tPaternal Inheritance Rights of illegitimates Under Mississippi Law: Greater Than Equal
Protection? 53 Mis;. L.J. 303 (June 1983).
64. Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(4) (Supp. 1985) provides that "[t]he children of illegitimates and their
descendants shall irherit from and through their mother and father according to the statutes of descent and
distribution."
65. 447 So. 2d 1278, 1282 (Miss. 1984), reh'g denied (1984).
66. Id. at 1283.
67. Earl Irene Siuart Kimble died on September 9, 1976, more than three years before Earl Kimble's death
on May 29, 1980. .d. at 1278.
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such a claim accrues only upon an intestate's death."n Furthermore,
the majority reasoned, since the remedy69 created by § 91-1-15
first came into existence on July 1, 1981,0 it was on that date
that Darlene Larsen's claim against her putative grandfather' first
accrued.' Therefore, the court concluded that Darlene Larsen did
have a right to assert a claim against Earl Kimble's estate."
In holding that the claim was timely filed, the majority first
noted that the amended statute contained two separate periods of
limitation governing claims against the intestate's estate.' The court
interpreted the three-year period of limitations' to relate "solely
to those claims accruing to an illegitimate as a result of the death
of an intestate prior to July 1, 1981." 6 As a result, the one-year
or ninety-day period" applies only to cases where the intestate
dies after July 1, 1981 ., Since Earl Kimble's death occurred be-
fore July 1, 1981, Darlene Larsen had until June 30, 1984, to
file her claim.'9 Because she filed her petitions in October of 1981,
she was well within the period of limitations," and the court
remanded her cause to the chancery court for consideration on
the merits of her heirship petition."
ANALYSIS
The Mississippi Legislature's amendments to § 91-1-15 great-
ly increased the inheritance rights of illegitimate children. Not
only were the dual requirements of marriage and paternal ac-
68. The court stated that
[ilt is undoubted law that a child, during the lifetime of the father, has no interest in his estate ....
[N]either wife nor child has any interest in the property of the husband and father during his lifetime;
dying intestate they would be his heirs, and to prove their relationship to him is to prove their title
to his property by desent [sic] when cast; but it is not to prove a claim that originated in his lifetime.
At the death of a person, dying intestate, eo instanti the title of the heirs accrues. 447 So. 2d at 1282
(quoting Estate of Kidd v. Kidd, 435 So. 2d 632, 635 (Miss. 1983) (quoting Covington v. Frank,
77 Miss. 606, 618, 27 So. 1000, 1000 (1900))).
69. The remedy is defined in § 91-1-15(l)(a) (Supp. 1985) as the right of an illegitimate to commence and
maintain a judicial proceeding to enforce a claim to inherit property from the estate of the natural mother or
father of such illegitimate, said claim having been heretofore prohibited by law, or prohibited by statutes re-
quiring marriage between the natural parents, or restrained, or enjoined by the order or process of any court
in this state.
70. 447 So. 2d at 1282.
71. Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(3)(d)(ii) (Supp. 1985).
72. "A cause of action accrues only when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim; that is, when
the right to sue becomes vested." 447 So. 2d at 1282 (quoting Estate of Kidd v. Kidd, 435 So. 2d 632, 635
(Miss. 1983)).
73. 447 So. 2d at 1282.
74. Id. at 1282-83,
75. Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(3)(d)(ii) (Supp. 1985).
76. 447 So. 2d at 1283.
77. MIss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(3)(c) (Supp. 1985).
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knowledgment dropped as prerequisites for the child's inheriting
from his or 'er father,8" but also a retrospective three-year "grace
period" was enacted to give all illegitimates and their descendants
a right to claim against the father's estate.8 The decision in Larsen
v. Kimble is significant in the majority's approval, interpretation,
and applicaeion of this controversial"' three-year "savings" pro-
vision.
The court'recognized that the amended statute was broader in
scope than the minimum equal protection guarantees enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Lalli.5 However, as the court noted,
allowing the illegitimate child an opportunity to seek an adjudi-
cation of paternity after the putative father's death does not un-
duly jeopardize the state's interests in avoiding stale or fraudulent
claims" and in maintaining a fair and just disposal of the intestate's
property." By raising the level of proof necessary to sustain a
claim from a preponderance of the evidence" to a standard of clear
and convincing evidence," while at the same time shortening the
periods of limitation in which to file a claim,"0 the legislature ade-
quately safeguarded the state's interests and afforded illegitimate
children equal protection under the law. "1
The legislature's far-reaching provisions, and the court's appli-
cation of those provisions in Larsen, are especially commendable
in light of the United States Supreme Court's uncertain guidance'
in this area of equal protection and the illegitimate child. Although
the Court's approval of the statute requiring an adjudication dur-
ing the father's lifetime evidences its refusal to hold states to one
rigid solution that the majority might think the "fairest," 9 a stat-
ute such as § 91-1-15, which goes beyond the minimum protec-
tion espoused in Trimble," follows the better course by allowing
82. Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15 (Supp. 1985).
83. Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(4)(d)(ii) (Supp. 1985).
84. See, e.g., Comment, Paternal Inheritance Rights of llegitimates Under Mississippi Law: Greater than
Equal Protection? 53 Miss, L.J. 303 (June 1983), in which the author argues against the validity of the three-
year savings clause, citing its threat to stability of land and property titles. Id. at 314-18.
85. "It should b noted that our statute is much greater in scope than that approved by the Supreme Court
in Lalli. Our statute permits an adjudication of paternity after the intestate's death whereas the New York stat-
ute did not." Larsez, 447 So. 2d at 1279 n.1.
86. "Because of the particular problems of proof [in paternity cases], spurious claims may be difficult to
expose." Lalli v. Lslli, 439 U.S. 259, 271 (1978).
87. 447 So. 2d at 1283.
88. This is the burden of proof required in actions to establish paternity during the father's lifetime. Ivy
v. State Dept. of Public Welfare, 449 So. 2d 779, 782 (Miss, 1984).
89. See C. McCoxticm, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 340 (3d ed. 1984).
90. The statute :,hortens this period to either one year or ninety days after the intestate's death. Miss. CODE
ANN. § 91-1-15(3) c) (Supp. 1985).
91. 447 So. 2d at 1283.
92. Note, Protecting the lnlegitimate's Right to Inherit, 6 OKLA. CITY U.L. Rav. 469, 472-73 (1981).
93. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 273; see also Seeburger, supra note 24, at 601.
94. This minimt protection would be provided by a middle ground between "complete exclusion and case-
by-case determination of paternity." Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771.
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all illegitimates an opportunity to assert a claim to their fathers'
estates. The amendments to § 91-1-15 did create a new remedy
to benefit all illegitimates without classification:9 those who desire
to claim against the estate of an intestate who died before July
1, 1981, have three years in which to file a claim;96 and in all
other cases the person asserting the claim has one year or ninety
days after the intestate's death to pursue the claim. 7
Because of the paucity of cases that have reached the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court on the issue, it is difficult to ascertain whether
many illegitimate children or their descendants have taken advan-
tage of the three-year grace period to assert claims to estates of
intestates dying before July 1, 1981, as did Darlene Larsen. Cer-
tainly, there is no evidence of a great deluge of spurious claims
and resulting upheaval of estates and titles to real property spawned
by this three-year period, as predicted by some critics of the pro-
vision. If Darlene Larsen is successful in establishing her heir-
ship in Earl Kimble's estate, it will, of course, be necessary to
reopen his estate, which has been closed since October 1980.
However, any short-term uncertainty as to the status of property"°°
should not, and under the Mississippi provision does not, out-
weigh the state's interest in protecting the inheritance rights of
illegitimate children, who, after all, are in no way responsible
for their status. 1' And if, in a particular case, a father did not
want his illegitimate child to inherit anything from him, nothing
in § 91-1-15 would prevent him from disinheriting his illegiti-
mate child in his will, as he could his legitimate child.
02
In Larsen, the majority also settled the confusion as to the ap-
propriate period of limitations to be applied under the amended
version of § 91-1-15.0 In Larsen, the court interpreted the pro-
visions of the 1981 amendment to set a one-year period of limita-
tions beginning at the death of the intestate.'"
Also, the court stated unequivocally that the three-year period
should apply to all cases in which the intestate died prior to July
1, 1981. 1 The Larsen decision, in which the cause of action is
95. Act of March 14, 1983, ch. 339, 1983 Miss. Laws 92.
96. Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(3)(d)(ii) (Supp. 1985).
97. Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(3)(c) (Supp. 1985).
98. Comment, Paternal Inheritance Rights, supra note 63, at 314-15.
99. 447 So. 2d at 1278.
100. Id. at 1281, noted in Act of March 14, 1983, ch. 339, 1983 Miss. Laws 92.
101. "[I]t is unjust and ineffective for society to express its condemnation of procreation outside the marital
relationship by punishing the illegitimate child who is in no way responsible for his situation and is unable
to change it." Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 352 (1978).
102. H. KRAUSE, supra note 9, at 93.
103. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
104. Larsen, 447 So. 2d at 1283.
105. Id.
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held to accrue only as of July 1, 1981, has been followed in sub-
sequent cases. ' 6
CONCLUSION
Even though the three-year "grace period" for filing claims
against estates of intestates who died before July 1, 1981 expired
on June 30, 1984, the court's interpretation that all claims con-
cerning such estates are covered by the three-year provision will
likely affect many cases pending in lower state courts. Moreover,
the court's delineation of the two periods of limitation contained
in § 91-1-15 "o was essential to the future application of the statute.
Also, for the first time since the enactment of the 1981 and 1983
amendments to § 91-1-15, the court took the opportunity to ana-
lyze the statute as a whole, interpreting the provisions with regard
to the legislative intent to afford illegitimate children equal pro-
tection while safeguarding important state interests in land dis-
position and administration.
In only a few years, the rights of illegitimates in Mississippi
to claim a share in their intestate fathers' estates have dramatical-
ly increased. Prior to the 1981 amendment, illegitimates' in-
heritance rights were subject to a rigid legitimation process over
which the children themselves had no control; today illegitimate
children have the option of seeking a post-mortem adjudication
of paternity to obtain a share of their fathers' estates. The Missis-
sippi Legislature went well beyond the mandate of the Supreme
Court in providing a remedy for illegitimates with claims against
their intestate natural fathers. Yet, in the process, the legislature
also drafted! the requirements so as to protect certain important
state interests. In doing so, the legislature created a system of in-
testate succession of which it may fairly be said, as did Justice
Dan Lee, that "U]ustice will thereby prevail wherein all may take
comfort, legitimates and illegitimates alike, that they will be treated
equally under the laws of the State of Mississippi. " '"
Laura C. Karlak
106. Burdette v. Crump, 472 So. 2d 959, 962 (Miss. 1985); Miller v. Watson, 467 So. 2d 672, 675 (Miss.
1985); Berry v. Be ry, 463 So. 2d 1031, 1032 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 90 (1985); Stevenson
v. Daniels, 446 So 2d 597, 598 (Miss. 1984).
107. See supra nftes 70-78 and accompanying text.
108. Larsen, 447 So. 2d at 283.
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